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PARTIAL SATISFACMION UNDER THE UCC
Alysse Kaplan
INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") deals with
secured transactions,' and sales of accounts2 and chattel paper.3 The
drafters created Article 9 to simplify the law of secured transactions so
that "present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less
cost and with greater certainty." 4 The drafters accomplished this goal by
replacing the varied security devices in existence at common law, with
one type of security device-the security agreement-thus basing Article
9 on the principle that "all security devices are functionally the same and
should follow similar rules and procedures."5 The drafters also curtailed
the myriad terms and procedures that were used before the creation of
Article 9,6 and left only simple concepts such as the security interest,' the
debtor,' and the secured party.9 The UCC approach is more flexible, and
distinctions based solely on form are no longer dispositive.'°
Under Article 9, a secured party creates a security interest in collat-
eral. 11 The security interest is simply a property right, the purpose of
1. A secured transaction is any transaction that "is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general
intangibles, chattel paper or accounts." U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1990). See also U.C.C.
§ 9-105(1) (1990) (defining documents and instruments); U.C.C. § 9-106 (1990) (defining
general intangibles); infra notes 2-3 (defining account and chattel paper respectively).
2. An account is "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has
been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1990).
3. Chattel paper consists of a writing that shows both a monetary obligation and
either a security interest in or a lease of specific goods, such as mortgages. See U.C.C.
§ 9-105(1)(b) (1990). When the transaction at issue involves more than one writing, then
the writings taken as a group will be considered chattel paper. See id.
4. U.C.C. § 9-101 official cmt. (1990).
5. Thomas M. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 9-
101[A][1] (1978).
6. Terms such as the "mortgagor," the "conditional vendee," the "lender," and the
"buyer of accounts" are all called the "secured party," while terms such as the "mortga-
gee," the "conditional vendor," the "pledgor," and the "payee of accounts" are all called
the "debtor". See U.C.C. § 9-105 official cmt. 1 (1990); 2 James J. White & Robert S.
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code: Practitioner's Edition 241 (3d ed. 1988).
7. A security interest is any "interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990).
8. The debtor is the party who "owes payment or other performance of the obliga-
tion secured ...and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(d) (1990).
9. The secured party is "a lender, seller or other person in whose favor there is a
security interest, including a person to whom accounts or chattel paper have been sold."
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (1990).
10. See U.C.C. § 9-101 official cmt. (1990).
11. Collateral is "property subject to a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c)
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which is to ensure that the debt is repaid.12 If the debtor defaults and the
debt is not repaid, the secured party can respond in one of three ways:
"He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce
the security interest by any available judicial procedure."' 3 Under the
foreclosure option, the secured party may either sell the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner and retain a deficiency judgment, 4 or
he may keep the collateral in satisfaction of the loan.15
This option of retaining the collateral in the event of default is fully
explained in section 9-505(2).16 In the past, this section has been inter-
preted as providing for retention only in exchange for full satisfaction of
the debt.17 Full satisfaction simply means that the debtor is left owing no
deficiency judgment,' 8 whether the value of the collateral is less than,
equal to, or greater than the amount of the debt. It is unclear, however,
whether section 9-505(2) permits possibilities in addition to full retention
and full satisfaction. For instance, may the secured party retain only
part of the collateral in exchange for partial satisfaction of the debt, with
the debtor still owing a deficiency judgment? Or, even if the creditor
(1990). Simply stated, collateral is the property put forward by the debtor to ensure that
the debt is repaid.
12. See Quinn, supra note 5, 9-101[A][4][c]. For a security interest in collateral to
be effective, either the creditor must take actual physical possession of the collateral or
the debtor must sign a security agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a) (1990).
13. U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1990).
14. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1990). Specifically, section 9-504 states:
[The] secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or
all of the collateral .... Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other
disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any
terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time,
place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. "[A] secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collat-
eral in satisfaction of the obligation." U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
16. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990). The text of Section 9-505(2) reads as follows:
In any other case involoving consumer goods or any other collateral a secured
party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satis-
faction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the
debtor if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying
his rights under this subsection. In the case of consumer goods no other notice
need be given. In other cases notice shall be sent to any other secured party
from whom the secured party has received (before sending his notice to the
debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim
of an interest in the collateral. If the secured party receives objection in writing
from a person entitled to receive notification within twenty-one days after the
notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the collateral under Section
9-504. In the absence of such written objection the secured party may retain the
collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.
Id.
17. The secured party can "keep the collateral as his own, thus discharging the obli-
gation and abandoning any claim for a deficiency." U.C.C. § 9-505(2) official cmt. I
(1990).
18. See Quinn, supra note 5, 9-505[A].
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forecloses on and retains all the collateral, may he still retain a deficiency
judgment?19
Pre-Code law permitted the debtor and the secured party to alter their
agreement and arrange for partial satisfaction. As the Restatement of
Security set forth:
Subsequent to the creation of a pledge the pledgee's ability to inflict an
oppressive bargain upon the pledgor is greatly diminished although not
wholly absent. The pledgor and pledgee should not be prevented from
making a bargain by which the pledged chattel can be taken in whole
or in part satisfaction of the pledgee's claim. Such a bargain will be
upheld so long as the pledgee is in a position to show that the bargain
is free from fraud or oppression.2'
Given the rise of such complex commercial transactions as multi-asset
financing,21 this option of partial satisfaction might still be extremely use-
ful. While the UCC's sale of collateral and retention/ful satisfaction
procedures are sufficient in some situations, they are too inflexible to
solve all of the problems that may arise in the commercial arena.
For example, suppose that a debtor utilizes two trucks as collateral for
a loan. If the debtor defaults, the creditor's sole options under the tradi-
tional approach to section 9-505(2) would be to take both trucks in full
satisfaction of the debt,22 or to sell both trucks in a commercially reason-
able manner as specified in section 9-504.1 This approach, however, is
too rigid. The creditor might want to keep only one of the trucks,2 or
might not want to bother with the problems and inconveniences of sell-
ing both trucks in a commercially reasonable manner." Moreover, the
debtor might have numerous reasons to veto the creditor's election to
retain the collateral,26 and might desire instead to work out a different
19. Compare Barkley Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code T 4.10(4) (2d ed. 1988) (partial satisfaction in return for retention of all
of the collateral does not contradict the policies of the UCC) and Peter F. Coogan, The
New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 520-21 (1973) (arguing for the allowance of
partial satisfaction in exchange for retention of all of the collateral) with William D.
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 9-505:08 (1986) (full satisfaction should
be the only alternative for retention of all of the collateral). Professor Hawkland also
raises the possibility of partial retention for full satisfaction of the debt. See id.
20. Restatement of Security § 55 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1941) (emphasis added).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 24-66.
22. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990).
23. See idL § 9-504.
24. The creditor might prefer to keep only one of the trucks because he might want to
obtain some property, but at the same time, not have all of his money tied up. Moreover,
the Code does not grant the creditor the option of retaining both trucks and then selling
only one. Cf Reeves v. Foutz & Tanner, Inc., 617 P.2d 149, 151 (N.M. 1980) (Section 9-
505 permits strict foreclosure, as long as the creditor intends to retain the collateral and
not resell it).
25. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing problems associated with
commercially reasonable sales).
26. For instance, the collateral might be worth more than the outstanding amount of
the debt owed by the debtor.
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agreement with the secured party that calls for partial retention of the
collateral or for a decreased deficiency judgment.27 In other words, both
parties could benefit from an agreement. However, the option of taking
one truck and having the debtor still be liable for some of the debt-a
more desirable alternative under such circumstances-is not directly ad-
dressed by the UCC.
Another situation not contemplated by section 9-505(2) is when collat-
eral has decreased in value from the time of the original transaction. In
this situation, the creditor will obviously not want to take the collateral
in full satisfaction of the debt. Furthermore, it might not be advanta-
geous for the creditor to sell the collateral. With the value of the collat-
eral having decreased, the secured party could potentially be left with a
large deficiency judgment against an insolvent debtor-a judgment on
which the secured party might never be able to collect. In addition, the
Code requires that the "reasonable expenses of retaldng, holding, prepar-
ing for sale. . . selling, . . . and the like"2" be added on to the deficiency
judgment,2 9 thus increasing both the creditor's dissatisfaction, and the
amount of the deficiency judgment.30
Finally, if the creditor were to dispose of the collateral, such a sale
would have to satisfy the commercially reasonable requirements of sec-
tion 9-504.31 Because sales of collateral have been overturned for being
commercially unreasonable,32 this could be a risky and undesirable op-
tion for a creditor to take.
This Note argues that courts should interpret the UCC expansively
and allow parties to fashion and enforce their own agreements providing
for partial satisfaction. Specifically, this Note proposes that courts
should allow a creditor to retain collateral in partial satisfaction of a se-
cured debt, if the debtor so agrees. Part I discusses in further detail the
current accepted procedures under the UCC for retention of the collat-
eral in full satisfaction of the debt or, alternatively, retention of a defi-
ciency judgment. Part II explores the option of retaining the collateral in
27. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
28. U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(a) (1990).
29. For a discussion of proceeds of disposition, see id.
30. While this is a risk of potential loss that the creditor accepts upon undertaking the
transaction, that is no reason to deny the parties the right to alter their agreement upon
default.
31. See supra note 14 (quoting text of section 9-504).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 259 (6th Cir. 1979) (public sale
declared not reasonable, even if all proper procedures for public resale were carried out);
Kobuk Eng'g & Contracting Servs. v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co, 568 P.2d 1007, 1012-
13 (Alaska 1977) (sale not commercially reasonable because of insufficient advertising by
creditor); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jackson, 466 N.E.2d 1330, 1332-33 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984) (sale not commercially reasonable when creditor sold truck wholesale, rather than
retail); Villella Enterprises v. Young, 766 P.2d 293, 297-98 (N.M. 1988) (two advertise-
ments in weekly legal periodical for sale of bar not commercially reasonable); Jefferson
Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 395 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (every act of dispo-
sition must be done in commercially reasonable manner).
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return for partial satisfaction under UCC section 9-505(2), and examines
how other UCC sections may favor or limit agreements for partial satis-
faction. Part III responds to numerous arguments opposing the partial
satisfaction option. Finally, this Note concludes that partial satisfaction
should be permitted under UCC section 9-505(2).
I. ACCEPTED PROCEDURES UNDER UCC § 9-505(2)
Traditionally, a creditor under a secured debt "may, after default, pro-
pose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation."33 Although
this rule is usually interpreted as referring to full satisfaction,3 the text
of the Code does not specify that satisfaction is to be in full .3  Rather,
the "full satisfaction" interpretation comes only from the official com-
ment to the Code36 which states that "the secured party may propose
under subsection (2) that he keep the collateral as his own, thus discharg-
ing the obligation and abandoning any claim for a deficiency."37 If a
creditor elects this method, he is left without a deficiency judgment. 38
Under UCC section 9-505(2), this retention provision can only be put
into effect at the creditor's election.39 A debtor, however, is not com-
pletely at a creditor's mercy when a creditor chooses this option. Rather,
under UCC section 9-505(2), the creditor must inform the debtor, in
writing, of his choice to retain the collateral.' The debtor may then
choose whether to allow the creditor to proceed in this fashion.4' Thus,
while the UCC grants the creditor the option of acting to retain the col-
lateral in satisfaction of the debt, the creditor cannot so proceed without
the debtor's permission,42 so long as the debtor objects within twenty-one
days.43
If the debtor objects to retention-most likely because he believes the
33. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990). Courts have held that while suing on the debt, it is a
"commercially reasonable" option for the creditor to retain the collateral. See First Int'l
Bank of Israel v. L. Blankenstein & Son, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (N.Y. 1983); Chem-
ical Bank v. Alco Gems Corp., 543 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
34. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 15 (quoting partial text of section 9-505(2)).
36. See U.C.C. § 9-505 official cmt. 1 (1990).
37. Id (emphasis added).
38. See Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1989); Leasing
Serv. Corp. v. Carbonex, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 79, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Tanenbaum v. Eco-
nomics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. 1982); Quinn, supra note 5, r 9-505(A);
White & Summers, supra note 6, § 27-8, at 588.
39. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990).
40. See i Section 9-505(2) provides that: "Written notice of such proposal shall be
sent to the debtor if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying
his rights under this subsection." Id.
41. See id Section 9-505(2) continues, "If the secured party receives objection in
writing from a person entitled to receive notification within twenty-one days after the
notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504."
Id
42. See id
43. See id
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collateral to be worth more than the amount of the outstanding debt-
the creditor must dispose of the collateral in a manner consistent with
section 9-504, while retaining a deficiency judgment for the unrecovered
debt.' The creditor would then either have to sell, lease, or otherwise
dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.45
In situations where a creditor retains collateral without informing his
debtor that he is keeping it in satisfaction of the debt, courts have split as
to what the effect of the creditor's action should be. Under these circum-
stances, some courts have held that the creditor's possession is automati-
cally considered to be retention in full satisfaction of the debt.46 They
reason that the Code intends to give the secured creditor two options: he
can either sell the repossessed collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner under section 9-504 and retain a deficiency judgment, or he can
retain the collateral itself in full satisfaction of the debt.4 7 Thus, as one
court has stated, "[t]he secured creditor cannot both avoid a more 'objec-
tive,' market-based valuation of the collateral and also obtain an addi-
tional 'deficiency judgment' remedy (unless the debtor expressly
consents)." 48
Other courts have held that lack of notice of an intention to retain
property in discharge of a debt does not constitute a proper retention.49
Some kind of affirmative act from the secured party is necessary for the
foreclosure process to begin.50 One court reasoned that, under section 9-
505(2), the option to retain the collateral is the creditor's, and this reten-
tion can only be exercised by written notice from the creditor to the
44. See id.
45. See U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1990). If either the creditor refuses to dispose of the col-
lateral, the debtor has paid at least 60% of the debt, or the creditor delays for more than
90 days after taking possession of the collateral, then the creditor can be held liable under
§ 9-507(1) for any losses incurred. See UCC §§ 9-505(1), 9-505(2), 9-505(2) official cnt. 2
(1990). UCC § 9-507(1) states:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with
the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropri-
ate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor... has a
right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provision[s] of this Part.
See also Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 488 P.2d 127 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (requiring credi-
tor to pay the statutory penalty when he kept a pickup truck for more than 90 days).
46. See Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173, 176 (lst Cir. 1989); In re Boyd,
73 B.R. 122, 124-25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); Shultz v. Delaware Trust Co., 360 A.2d
576, 578 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Haufler v. Ardinger, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
893, 896-97 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Millican v. Turner, 503 So. 2d 289, 291 (Miss. 1987);
Schmode's, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 361 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Neb. 1985); Swanson v. May, 697
P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
47. See Lamp Fair, 888 F.2d at 176-77; Farmer's State Bank v. Otten, 204 N.W.2d
178, 180 (S.D. 1973).
48. Lamp Fair, 888 F.2d at 177.
49. See Chemical Bank v. Alco Gems Corp., 543 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Mitchell, 464 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983);
Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genesee Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 73, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
50. See, e.g., McCullough v. Mobiland, Inc., 228 S.E.2d 146, 148-49 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976).
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debtor."' Thus, under a literal reading of section 9-505(2), some credi-
tors have been required to take affirmative action in the form of written
notice of an intention to retain collateral.5 2
However, section 9-505(2) is not designed to protect the debtor from a
wrongful sale. 3 Therefore, the debtor may only protect his rights with
the remedies provided to him by UCC section 9-507.1
II. THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL SATISFACTION
UNDER UCC § 9-505(2)
A. The Proposal
Section 9-505(2) expressly allows the debtor to waive or modify his
rights under this section. Significantly, this option of waiver or modifica-
tion is only permitted after the debtor has defaulted, and therefore the
parties are not allowed to change the rules of section 9-505(2) in their
security agreement.55 The debtor cannot waive his rights under section
9-505(2) at the time the transaction is entered into.
All authorities agree, however, that this waiver of rights permits the
debtor to waive his right to written notice of the creditor's intention to
keep the collateral in exchange for satisfaction of the debt.5 6 Some com-
mentators also contend that this waiver includes the debtor's right to
object to the creditor's suggestion of retention within twenty-one days of
when that suggestion was sent. 7
Arguably, the debtor has an additional right under section 9-505(2)-
namely, the right to full satisfaction of the debt in exchange for the credi-
tor keeping the collateral.5" The issue thus arises whether the waiver of
51. See Flickinger, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Under section 9-507, the debtor may restrain or force disposition of the collateral,
or if disposition has already occurred, then he may proceed against the creditor for any
losses occasioned by his unpermitted conduct. See supra note 45 (providing text of sec-
tion 9-507); see also Farmers Bank v. Hubbard, 276 S.E.2d 622, 626-27 (Ga. 1981) (deny-
ing bank deficiency judgment when it failed to prove that sale of collateral was
commercially reasonable); Harris v. Bower, 295 A.2d 870, 876 (Md. 1972) (suggesting
that the debtor's deficiency judgment should be lessened by the value of the yacht at the
time it was repossessed by the creditor, rather than the depreciated value of the boat two
years later); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 574,
577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (suggesting that, to obtain a deficiency judgment, the creditor
must overcome the presumption that collateral was at least equal to debt, when sale was
not commercially reasonable (citing Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511,
513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)).
55. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990) (secured party proposing to retain the collateral
must notify the debtor of this intent unless the debtor "has not signed after default a
statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this subsection") (emphasis added).
56. See Hawkland, supra note 19, § 9-5:01; Quinn, supra note 5, at 9-336; 2 White &
Summers, supra note 6, at 586.
57. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 521.
58. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2); Clark, supra note 19, 4.10[3], at 4-159 to -160, Coogan,
supra note 19, at 522.
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rights under section 9-505(2) refers to the debtor's right to full satisfac-
tion, as well as to the debtor's rights to receive notice and to object
within twenty-one days.59 This Note suggests that the options of waiver
and modification should apply to this additional debtor protection.'
B. UCC Section 1-102(3)'s Fair Dealing
Section 1-102(3) of the UCC permits the debtor and the creditor to
craft their own agreement, so long as it is not manifestly unreasonable to
either side.61 Section 1-102(3) thus states:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may
not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement de-
termine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is
to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 62
Moreover, the official comment to section 1-102 even goes so far as to say
that "[t]his Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that ... it will provide
its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices." 63
As indicated by section 1-102, the drafters intended the Code to be a
flexible instrument that would not chain the debtor and the creditor to
rigid and unyielding rules-as was the case under pre-Code law"-but
instead, would allow the parties to fashion their own agreements. In fact,
the official comment further states that "[i]t is intended to make it possi-
ble for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the
light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices. '6
The drafters of the Code thus did not pretend to foresee all possible
situations that could arise in the commercial world and would be subject
to the Code's provisions. As one commentator suggested, it is likely that
the drafters considered only simple scenarios while drafting the Code,
such as when the collateral and debt are roughly equivalent in value.
Specifically, the Code and its comments give no indication that the draft-
ers contemplated multi-asset financing-wherein the creditor might want
to retain only part of the collateral, but would not do so if he had to
forego all of his deficiency judgment in exchange; nor did the drafters
necessarily foresee a situation in which the collateral has greatly de-
creased in value and is now worth much less than the debt. These "un-
foreseen" situations demonstrate the need for allowing partial
59. See Clark, supra note 19, 4.10[4], at 4-160 to -162; White & Summers, supra
note 6, at 588. But see Hawkland, supra note 19, § 9-505:08 (taking the position that the
debtor cannot waive his right to full satisfaction).
60. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
61. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. official cmt. 1.
64. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
65. U.C.C. § 1-102 official cmt. 1 (1990) (emphasis added).
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satisfaction in return for retention of collateral by a secured party, and
appear consistent with the Code's stated desire to provide a flexible and
adaptable set of rules.
Again, the requirement of full satisfaction is not specifically mentioned
in the Code,6 6 although it is clarified in the official comment to UCC
section 9-505.6 Thus, it could be argued that the Code does not provide
for partial satisfaction. Nevertheless, because this comment is not part of
the text of the statute,6 8 and because the statute itself is ambiguous as to
whether satisfaction should be full or partial, section 9-505 should in-
stead be viewed as a few other Code sections are viewed-namely, as a
foundation that will be in place as long as the parties do not alter the
terms among themselves.6 9 This approach is authorized by Code section
1-102(3)'s statement that "[tlhe effect of provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement."7 0 Additionally, the language in section 9-505(2)
seems to authorize this view, because it specifically says that the debtor
may renounce or modify his rights after default.7
In accordance with the Code's purpose as expressed in section 1-102,
section 9-505(2) should be interpreted with as much flexibility as is rea-
sonable. The parties should be able to structure their own agreement, as
long as it comports with the requirements of good faith and fair deal-
ing.72 Good faith is essential, of course, because the provisions in Article
66. Instead the Code just requires "satisfaction." See id § 9-505(2); see also supra
note 15 (providing text of section).
67. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the question of
full satisfaction.
68. Put simply, the comments to the Code lack the force of law. See Miller v. Preitz,
221 A.2d 320, 323 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1966), overruled by Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d
848 (Pa. 1968), on other grounds. As some commentators have explained: "The [Code]
itself is law in the 49 states that have adopted the Code, but the comments are not since
they have not been enacted by the legislatures." John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo,
The Law of Contracts 16 (3d ed. 1987). "Of course, if the Code and a comment are in
conflict, the Code must prevail." Id.
69. One example of such an approach is found in UCC section 2-210(3), in which
duties that are usually deemed non-assignable can be made assignable upon agreement by
the parties involved. See U.C.C. § 2-210(3) (1990); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 68, at
741. Another example is that parties entering into a contract may provide for acceptance
to be manifested in a specific manner. Otherwise, under section 2-206(1), an offer can be
accepted in any manner. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1990); Calamari & Perillo, supra note
68, at 127-28. In addition, regarding the allocation of risk, UCC section 2-509 provides
that the risk will initially be upon the seller, but the parties can, amongst themselves, alter
this basis and have the initial risk be on the buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-509 (1990); Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 68, at 581.
70. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990).
71. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990). This authorization is similar to the authorization
given in the sections mentioned above. See supra note 69; see, also U.C.C. § 2-210(4)
(1990) (containing the language "unless the language or the circumstances.., indicate
the contrary"); U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1990) (containing the language "[u]nless otherwise
unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances"); U.C.C. § 2-509(4) (1990)
(stating that "[tihe provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement of the
parties").
72. The U.C.C. states that "[g]ood faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or
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1-particularly good faith and fair dealing-apply to all transactions
that are covered by the Code,73 including secured transactions under Ar-
ticle 9.
If a creditor wants to keep all or part of the collateral, retention should
not bar him from pursuing a deficiency judgment, so long as the debtor
has assented to this course of action. The UCC's firm requirement of
debtor assent before the secured party can proceed 4 is an effective pro-
tective measure that will help a debtor avoid exploitation and overreach-
ing by a secured party. A debtor will only assent to partial satisfaction if
he thinks that it is in his interest to have the secured party keep the
collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt, rather than to dispose of it in
a commercially reasonable manner.
7 5
C. UCC Section 9-501(3) and the Limitation on Modifications
Despite the flexibility embodied in UCC section 1-102(3), section 9-
501(3)(a) states that the provisions of section 9-505(2) concerning the
acceptance of collateral in discharge of an obligation "may not be waived
or varied."76 Notwithstanding such explicit language, section 9-501(3)
does allow some variation in section 9-505(2):
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on
the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred to below
may not be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compul-
sory disposition of collateral ... but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the fulfillment of these rights and
duties is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.7 7
Therefore, despite its limiting provisions, section 9-501 can be inter-
preted as not inhibiting the waiver of full satisfaction under section 9-
transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990). Moreover, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts states that examples of bad faith include: "evasion of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance,
abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party's performance." Restatement (Second) Contracts § 205 (1979) (emphasis added).
See also Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) ("good faith"
is an honest intention not to unfairly take advantage of another); Doyle v. Gordon, 158
N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (" 'Good faith' is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory definition. It encompasses, among other things,
an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage.") (emphasis added); Quinn, supra note 5, 1-29 ("The test is the
conduct of the actor himself: whether he is or is not acting decently.").
73. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 68, at 501.
74. See supra note 15 (quoting text of U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990)).
75. Professor Hawkland raises the possibility that this might result in overreaching by
the creditor, but, as indicated later on, his argument can be refuted. See Hawkland, supra
note 19, § 9-501:09; infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
76. U.C.C. § 9-501(3)(a) (1990).
77. Id. (emphasis added). The official comment to UCC section 9-501 further states,
"the specified rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party may not be waived or
varied except as stated." Id., § 9-501 official cmt. 4 (1990) (emphasis added).
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505(2). Section 9-505(2) specifically says that the debtor may renounce
or modify his rights under this subsection and section 9-501 only requires
that the rules of section 9-505(2) are invariable. Therefore, the remaining
question is whether one of the rights referred to in section 9-505(2) is the
right to full satisfaction."8 If it is, then section 9-505(2) expressly allows
the parties to tailor their own agreement after default.7 9 On the other
hand, if section 9-505(2)'s waiver-of-rights provision is construed as not
specifically referring to the right to full satisfaction, this will preclude the
possibility of allowing the parties to fashion their own agreement, given
section 9-501(3)'s stricture that section 9-505(2) may not be waived or
varied "to the extent that [it] give[s] rights to the debtor and impose[s]
duties on the secured party."8" In this latter scenario, full satisfaction is
a non-modifiable obligation of the creditor, rather than a waivable right
of the debtor, and section 9-501(3) would prohibit any agreement for
partial satisfaction.
For numerous reasons, full satisfaction should be construed to be a
debtor's right under section 9-505(2). First, it is illogical to argue that a
creditor's obligation is not also a debtor's right. When the secured party
retains collateral under section 9-505(2), the right of retention will re-
quire the creditor to give up his right to a deficiency judgment against the
debtor. Nevertheless, because only the debtor is in a position to insist
that the creditor forego a deficiency judgment as required by the Code,"
it makes little practical difference whether this discharge is described as
the creditor's obligation or the debtor's right. Either way, the debtor
may or may not demand full satisfaction, depending upon his specific
needs. This is particularly true given that, if the creditor refuses to give
full satisfaction, the debtor can refuse to allow retention and demand a
commercially reasonable sale of the collateral.8 2 Thus, this creditor's ob-
ligation would seem to create a corresponding right in the debtor-
namely, the right to full satisfaction of the debt when the secured party
78. Assuming, of course, that section 9-505(2) actually requires full satisfaction. But
see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (disputing this assumption).
79. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 521 (stating that section 9-505(2) should be con-
strued as allowing waiver by the debtor of his right to full satisfaction).
80. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1990).
81. This, of course, is not entirely true. Section 9-505(2) states that "notice shall be
sent to any other secured party from whom the secured party has received... written
notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral" and that the secured party may receive an
objection to retention from any "person entitled to receive notification." U.C.C. § 9-
505(2) (1990) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why, in most instances,
an interested third party would object to partial satisfaction, as such a situation will leave
the debtor with either collateral that he would not otherwise have under the retention/
full satisfaction scenario, or with a lesser deficiency judgment. See supra notes 22-29 and
accompanying text. In other words, partial satisfaction will leave the debtor in a better
financial state, increasing the possibility that the interested, but subordinated, third party
will also be compensated. In fact, where the debtor will not be left financially better off
by partial satisfaction, this Note would limit its use. See infra notes 115-39 and accompa-
nying text
82. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 522.
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retains the collateral.8 3
Second, language inserted into the re-draft of the Code in 1972 indi-
cates that the drafters intended the debtor's right of full satisfaction to be
waivable and modifiable. When the drafters revised the Code, they ad-
ded the phrase "if [the debtor] has not signed after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his rights under this subsection" into section 9-
505(2), as part of the sentence that gives the debtor the right to written
notice of retention. 4 In the same 1972 revisions, a similar phrase was
added to section 9-504(3), retaining the debtor's right to notification of
the sale of collateral, but only "if [the debtor] has not signed after default
a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale."' 5
The wording added to section 9-504(3) shows a clear intention to specifi-
cally limit the debtor's right to notification of sale of the collateral. In
83. See id.
84. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990) (emphasis added). The full sentence of the relevant por-
tion states: "Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has not
signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this subsec-
tion." U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990). The previous version, without the waiver provision,
stated:
In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collateral a secured
party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satis-
faction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the
debtor and except in the case of consumer goods to any other secured party who
has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing state-
ment indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or is known by the secured
party in possession to have a security interest in it. If the debtor or other person
entitled to receive notification objects in writing within thirty days from the
receipt of the notification or if any other secured party objects in writing within
thirty days after the secured party obtains possession the secured party must
dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504. In the absence of such written
objection the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the
debtor's obligation.
U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1957). This previous draft does not make any mention of waiver of
rights after default.
85. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990) (emphasis added). The pre-1972 Code stated:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect
of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, rea-
sonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notifi-
cation of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to
be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in the case
of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the collat-
eral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the
debtor in this state or who is known by the secured party to have a security
interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy
at private sale.
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1957). This previous version did not include any provision for waiver
of the right to notification after default.
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contrast, such specific language is lacking from the addition to section 9-
505(2), which actually refers to "rights" in the plural. If the drafters had
intended the rights in section 9-505(2) to be limited to the right to notifi-
cation, they would have specified this as they did in section 9-504(3).
That the drafters instead chose not to limit their language in this way
suggests that the waivable rights that exist under section 9-505(2) are not
limited to the right to notification.
Finally, an approach that reads section 9-505(2) as authorizing partial
satisfaction is preferable to an approach that would not allow the parties
to tailor their own post-default agreements because it increases the flexi-
bility of the Code. To refer again to the example in which the debtor has
put up two trucks as collateral, partial satisfaction does not require the
debtor to choose between: (1) the option of allowing retention, resulting
in the debtor owing no deficiency judgment, but also being left with no
assets, and (2) the option of requiring the collateral to be sold, resulting
in the debtor still having no assets, but adding as well the potential bur-
den of owing a deficiency judgment to the secured party. Instead, under a
broad reading of section 9-505(2), the debtor and the secured party could
arrange an alternative agreement in which the debtor will not be left be-
reft of all his assets and may be able to negotiate a lower deficiency judg-
ment in return for allowing partial satisfaction. At the same time, the
creditor will be better able to protect his investment by retaining one of
the trucks as well as a manageable deficiency judgment against the
debtor. 8
6
Similarly, the benefits of partial satisfaction are present in the situation
where the collateral has decreased in value since the time of the original
transaction. Obviously, the creditor would not want to take such collat-
eral in full satisfaction of the debt, nor would he desire to dispose of it
under section 9-504 given the huge deficiency judgment against an insol-
vent debtor that would likely remain. 7 With partial satisfaction, how-
ever, the parties can work out an agreement wherein the secured party
could keep the collateral and still retain a decreased deficiency judgment
against the debtor. In this way, the creditor will lose less money because
the amount of this deficiency judgment will be smaller, and he will have
an increased chance of collecting this deficiency judgment from the insol-
vent debtor. Moreover, a debtor might prefer this option given his need
to maintain good business relations with both the secured party and with
the financial and business communities as a whole.
An additional benefit of partial satisfaction to both the creditor and the
debtor is that they can more often avoid disposing of the collateral. The
debtor, for example, can arrange for a smaller deficiency judgment. In
turn, the secured party will not need to comply with the rules of selling
the collateral in the commercially reasonable manner dictated by section
86. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
87. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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9-504.11 Under that section's requirements, a host of problems are possi-
ble: (1) the secured party might not get much for selling the collateral;
(2) the debtor might still be left owing the difference, with the "reason-
able expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale... selling... and
the like" added on to the deficiency; 9 and (3) the sale may very well be
overturned as being commercially unreasonable.'
Finally, it is not necessary to interpret section 9-505(2) as precluding
partial satisfaction in order to protect the debtor. The debtor's ability to
thwart the creditor's request 9' for retention of the collateral demon-
strates that the creditor is not all-powerful in the debtor/creditor rela-
tionship and does not need to be shielded.
For all of these reasons, section 9-505(2) should be interpreted as
granting the debtor a right to full satisfaction. The combihed effect of
sections 9-505(2) and 9-501(3) would then authorize retention in return
for partial satisfaction-section 9-505(2) by allowing the waiver and
modification of rights and section 9-501(3) by providing that the right to
allow waivers and modifications cannot be taken away.
92
D. The Case Law Concerning Partial Satisfaction
As demonstrated above, the Code can and should be interpreted flexi-
bly to allow for partial satisfaction. This flexibility would coincide with
the First Circuit's view of Article 9 as expressed in Lamp Fair, Inc. v.
Perez-Ortiz.9a In Lamp Fair, the court noted that although the creditor's
possession of collateral automatically qualified as retention in full satis-
faction of the debt,94 it would be permissible for a debtor to expressly
consent to an alternative scenario.95 Although stated in dictum, the First
Circuit unequivocally indicated that the debtor and creditor should be
allowed to modify their rights under section 9-505(2).96
Professors White and Summers also agree that section 9-505(2) pro-
vides for partial satisfaction when the debtor and the secured party both
decide that the secured party can keep the collateral and that the debtor
will still owe part of the debt.97 These commentators ground their argu-
88. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1990); supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing sales
in a commercially reasonable manner).
89. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a) (1990).
90. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
92. Again, the limitations on this right are: (1) that modification can only take place
after default, see U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990); and (2) that the accord must be in good faith
as required by U.C.C. § 1-203 of the Code, see UCC § 1-203 (1990). See Clark, supra
note 19, at 4-161.
93. 888 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1989).
94. See id. at 177. The court did not think it fair to allow the secured party to get
what would be equivalent to a deficiency judgment calculated with a market-based value
of the collateral. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See White & Summers, supra note 6, at 588.
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ment upon a New York court decision, S.M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genesee
Corp.,9 in which both the majority opinion and the dissent agreed that
the debtor can waive or modify his right to full satisfaction, with the
debtor remaining liable for a deficiency judgment.99 The majority in
Flickinger reasoned that, under section 9-501(3), the parties had the
"power to set the standards by which their rights and duties were to be
measured."" The dissent, citing section 9-505(2), stated:
If the debtor waives his right to full satisfaction, the secured party may
then recover a deficiency judgment based upon the amount of the debt
less the value of the collateral. If the debtor refuses to waive full satis-
faction, the secured party has the choice of retaining the collateral in
full satisfaction of the debt or selling it to a third party under the provi-
sions of section 9-504.101
Thus, the dissent would have allowed partial satisfaction if the debtor
had waived his rights, but argued that the summary judgment should
have been reversed because factually it had not been decided whether or
not there had been a waiver.
Another case allowing the secured party to retain collateral and still
recover a deficiency judgment is Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Hesco
Construction, Inc.12 In Hesco, the court upheld a lease provision that
allowed the lessor to keep equipment in partial satisfaction of an unpaid
debt. 10 3 The court assumed that the lease was an Article 9 security inter-
est, yet allowed the lessor to recover the unpaid rent under a liquidated-
damages provision, even though the lessor had not conducted a foreclo-
sure sale under section 9-504.11 The court reasoned that the special
remedies provision in the lease replaced the Article 9 provisions.' 05
Nothing in Article 9 would seem to authorize the result in Hesco be-
cause, while section 9-501(1) permits "cumulative remedies, it does not
98. 423 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
99. See id at 76-77.
100. Id at 76. This reasoning, however, was not based upon section 9-505(2) and its
waiver of rights provision, but rather upon section 9-501(3). See id Under this section,
"the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of the[ir]
rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1990). This reasoning is not proper, because section 9-501(3) states
that section 9-505(2) "may not be waived or varied" with regard to "acceptance of collat-
eral as discharge of obligation." U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1990). Since this section expressly
forbids the alteration of section 9-505(2), the court should not have been able to reach its
conclusion without use of the waiver provision in section 9-505(2). See U.C.C. § 9-505(2)
(1990).
Despite the fact that the Flickinger court reasoned in this way, its conclusion is in
accord with my proposal. Therefore, at least in the opinion of one court, the result that I
propose is not inconsistent with the UCC.
101. Flickinger, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (Moule, J., dissenting).
102. 614 P.2d 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
103. See id at 1306.
104. See id at 1305.
105. See idL
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countenance remedies that conflict with the provisions of Article 9,"106
as did the lease's special remedies provision. Nevertheless, Hesco is im-
portant because it demonstrates a liberal approach to the Code in its ap-
proval of partial satisfaction.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PARTIAL SATISFACTION
A. Analogy to Private Sales of Collateral
In deciding how to interpret section 9-505(2)'s waiver of rights, oppo-
nents of partial satisfaction might argue that it indirectly allows the se-
cured party to do that which the UCC forbids. For example, in section
9-504, a secured creditor is allowed to buy collateral at a public sale, but
is not always allowed to do so at a private sale.17 In fact, a creditor will
only be able to buy at a private sale when "the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market010 or is of a type which is the
subject of widely distributed standard price quotations." 109 These re-
strictions exist to protect the debtor from an overreaching creditor. If
the collateral is sold in a recognized market or is the subject of widely
distributed standard price quotations, the price at which the collateral
should be sold is more predictable, and the secured party will be unable
to buy it for less. Thus, the secured party is prevented from taking ad-
vantage of the debtor's vulnerable position.
If the Code allowed a creditor both to retain the collateral and to re-
ceive a deficiency judgment against the debtor, some argue that the con-
cerns of section 9-504 would be indirectly implicated, because this
arrangement would be equivalent to allowing the secured party to buy
the collateral at a private sale, circumventing the restrictions of section 9-
504.110 There is, however, one very important difference. When the
creditor buys the collateral at a private sale, the debtor does not influence
106. Clark, supra note 19, at 4-162.
107. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1990); Coogan, supra note 19, at 523.
108. In Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970), the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky defined "a recognized market" as a market "where sales
involve many items so similar that individual differences are nonexistent or immaterial,
where haggling and competitive bidding are not primary factors in each sale, and where
the prices paid in actual sales of comparable property are currently available by quota-
tion." 452 S.W.2d at 377 (citing Norton v. Nat'l Bank, 398 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Ark. 1966))
(rejecting the existence of a recognized market for used cars). Additional examples of
this type of market are a commodities market or a stock market. See id.
109. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990). The phrase "widely distributed standard price quota-
tions" has undergone some refinement. An Arkansas court has said that "a guide to the
price of a [good] of that year, make and model in an average condition," does not consti-
tute a widely distributed standard price quotation. See Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc.,
451 S.W.2d 199, 202-03 (Ark. 1970). Similarly, a Pennsylvania court rejected as insuffi-
cient an auto industry price manual, because it "is adopted for the convenience and bene-
fit of dealers and is not based on market prices which are arrived at in the open, based on
asking prices of sellers and bids of prospective buyers." Alliance Discount Corp. v.
Shaw, 171 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961).
110. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 521; supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text
(describing Section 9-504).
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the price that is set. The transaction is one-sided, with all the power held
by the creditor. Because section 9-504 is concerned with commercial rea-
sonableness and protecting the debtor, it is easy to see why courts will
not allow this, absent a clearly defined price.
In contrast, these concerns are not implicated in the partial satisfaction
procedure because the debtor directly participates in arranging the terms
of the deal and is not required to allow partial satisfaction. 11 The ra-
tional debtor will not agree to partial satisfaction if he does not believe
that it will make him better off. Therefore, while it might seem that a
creditor wields a greater degree of power than a debtor in the default
situation, and while this may be a particular concern with a private sale
of collateral, in the partial satisfaction scenario it is still the debtor's deci-
sion whether or not to allow a modification or waiver.
B. Analogy to Accord and Satisfaction
Some critics of partial satisfaction argue that UCC section 9-505(2) is
a species of accord and satisfaction" 2 and, therefore, deny the legitimacy
of partial satisfaction. In fact, adhering to this view, some courts have
construed section 9-505(2) as permitting full satisfaction only, reasoning
that the accord and satisfaction is the debtor's release of the collateral in
exchange for the secured party's abandoning of any deficiency judg-
ment.' 13 This analogy, however, is problematic and bereft of any support
from the Code.
Instead of analogizing partial satisfaction under section 9-505(2) to ac-
cord and satisfaction, a more appropriate comparison would be with the
principles of modification of contracts. Under common-law principles
for modification of an agreement, both parties must offer considera-
111. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 520. Section 9-505(2) should be interpreted as al-
lowing waiver by the debtor of his right to full satisfaction, even "in light of 9-504(3)'s
prohibition of the secured party's purchase of the collateral at a private sale." Id. at 521.
112. See Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Deephouse
Equip. Co., 38 B.R. 400, 404 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); Johnson v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 159 S.E.2d 290, 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968); Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 156 S.E.2d
310, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); R. J. Robertson, Jr., Rights and Obligations of Buyers with
Respect to Goods in Their Possession After Rightful Rejection of Justifiable Revocation of
Acceptance, 60 Ind. L.J. 663, 707 (1985).
Accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging a claim in which the parties agree
to give and accept something in settlement of the claim and perform the agreement. See
Holm v. Hansen, 248 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Iowa 1976).
113. See Warnaco, 872 F.2d at 544 (stating that "the secured party may agree to ac-
cept the collateral in satisfaction of the debt under section 9-505, the U.C.C. equivalent of
common-law accord and satisfaction"); Deephouse Equip., 38 B.R. at 404 (when creditor
pleads accord and satisfaction under section 9-505(2), it is the debtor's duty to prove
intent to discharge the debt).
An accord is defined as "an offer to give or to accept a stipulated performance in the
future in satisfaction or discharge of the obligor's existing duty plus an acceptance of that
offer." Calamari & Perillo, supra note 68, at 214-15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Here, the secured party will retain the collateral in satisfaction or discharge of the
debtor's existing duty.
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tion."' 4 Under the UCC, however, this has changed to reflect the Code's
emphasis on flexibility and the facilitation of commercial transactions.
UCC section 2-209(1) specifies that no consideration is necessary to mod-
ify a contract. In this spirit of flexibility, it makes little sense to bind the
parties to a secured transaction based on the rigid formulations of accord
and satisfaction. Instead, the debtor and creditor should be allowed to
modify their security agreement as they would any contract under the
Code.
Courts wishing to establish a bright-line rule regarding when modifica-
tion would be unconscionable could specify that both parties have to give
up something, similar to traditional common-law principles of considera-
tion. 15 For instance, the debtor would give up his right to full satisfac-
tion and the secured party would waive his right to receive a full
deficiency judgment. The modification would have to put the debtor in a
better position than under the traditional option of disposition of collat-
eral. Because both routes could leave the debtor without the collateral,
the partial satisfaction option would likely require the debtor's deficiency
judgment to be less than it would be if the collateral were sold, meaning
simply that the value of the collateral subtracted from the debt should be
more than the sale price of the collateral.
This requirement, moreover, will not impede the viability of the partial
satisfaction proposal. Logically, the debtor will only be willing to ap-
prove a retention agreement when, although he still will owe a deficiency
judgment, the amount of that judgment is less than the amount of the
judgment that he would owe otherwise-especially if the collateral were
sold at a public sale, and all the costs incurred in that sale were added on,
as required by section 9-504(l)(a).
As with all contracts and modifications covered by the UCC, the credi-
tor's superior bargaining position would not be enough to render a partial
satisfaction arrangement invalid. 1 6 Additional elements of unfairness
would have to be present, such as "where freedom of contract is ex-
ploited by a stronger party who has control of the negotiations due to the
weaker party's ignorance, feebleness ... or general naivete."'"1 7 There-
fore, in the absence of fraud or actual exploitation, any modified agree-
ment reached by the parties would be acceptable.
In addition to a mutual consideration requirement, courts should re-
114. See Wisconsin and Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 385 (1903); Alleghany
College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1927); Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 68, at 262.
115. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
116. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 68, at 407.
117. Id. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50
(D.C. Cir 1965) (courts should consider the inequality of the bargaining power of a party
who signs a commercially unreasonable contract); Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Uncon-
scionalbility: Defining the Principle, 9 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 765, 808 (1978) (stating that
courts have used the presence of unequal bargaining power in determining whether an
agreement was unconscionable).
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quire, for evidentiary purposes, that both the waiver and the modification
should be in writing.1"' This would greatly simplify the court's job of
interpreting and enforcing these agreements.
C. Sacrificing Debtor's Rights and Overreaching
by the Secured Party
Some commentators have argued that allowing flexibility and modifi-
cation will come at the expense of the debtor's rights. For example, Pro-
fessor Hawkland rejects the proposition that the secured party can retain
all of the collateral in exchange for partial satisfaction of the debt." 9
Hawkland reasons that partial satisfaction would be unfair because the
debtor is left with no collateral, and yet is still burdened with a deficiency
judgment. 120
Professor Hawkland, however, does not consider the possibility that
the debtor is still better off under partial satisfaction than if the debtor
refused to allow such an option. For example, if the secured party were
forced to go through with a public sale as specified under UCC section 9-
504, both the costs of the sale and the typically low prices of judicial
sales 21 could leave the debtor with no collateral, as well as the possibility
of an even larger deficiency judgment once the costs of the sale are added
on and only the low sale price is subtracted. Nor does Professor Hawk-
land consider the possibility of the parties arranging an agreement
whereby the secured party keeps the collateral and, in exchange for the
debtor allowing him to keep a deficiency judgment, the amount sub-
tracted from the debtor's debt is worth more than the collateral."2
Finally, the basic requirements of section 9-505(2) protect the debtor
118. This requirement coincides with section 2-209(3) which states: "The requirements
of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the
contract as modified is within its provisions." U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (1990). section 2-201
further states: "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties." U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1990)
(emphasis added).
119. See Hawkland, supra note 19, § 9-505:08. Professor Hawkland, however, is not
completely rigid in his view of the Code. For example, he believes that the secured party
should be able to keep part of the collateral in exchange for full satisfaction of the debt.
In his view, this option does not harm the debtor because he is left with some of the
collateral, and with no deficiency judgment. See id.
120. See iL
121. Cf U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1990) (stating that "[t]he fact that a better price could
have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected
by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a
commercially reasonable manner"); C.I.T. Corp. v. Duncan Grading & Constr. Inc., 739
F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1984) (it is not sufficient to prove commercial unreasonableness
that a higher price might have been obtained by a sale at a different time or under differ-
ent circumstances); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Cornelius & Rush Coal Co., 508 F. Supp.
63, 68 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (same); Monahan Loan Serv., Inc. v. Janssen, 349 N.W.2d 752,
757 (Iowa 1984) (a price discrepancy, while an important factor, is not determinative in
resolving questions of whether a sale was commercially reasonable).
122. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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under partial satisfaction from overreaching by the creditor because,
under this section, the debtor's permission is necessary before the secured
party can foreclose by retaining the collateral.123 This protects the
debtor because he need only withhold permission if he believes the pro-
posed agreement is unfair or less advantageous than a commercially rea-
sonable sale.
CONCLUSION
Partial satisfaction should be allowed under UCC section 9-505(2).
UCC section 1-102 provides that the UCC "is drawn to provide flexibil-
ity so that ... it will provide its own machinery for expansion of com-
mercial practices."' 24  Analysis of this provision, as well as the
limitations imposed by section 9-501(3), reveals that section 9-505(2)
could properly be interpreted in a manner that increases the flexibility of
secured agreements without sacrificing the debtor's rights as protected
under section 9-501(3). This goal can be accomplished by allowing the
debtor to waive his right to full satisfaction under section 9-505(2), and
by providing for retention of the collateral upon the default of the debtor
in combination with a deficiency judgement.
Allowing the parties to have the flexibility of partial satisfaction will
help facilitate business transactions, will avoid costly litigation, and will
enhance the parties' satisfaction with their agreements-instead of re-
quiring them to live with the other all-or-nothing alternatives. Nothing
could be more in tune with the spirit of the Uniform Commercial Code.
123. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1990).
124. U.C.C. § 1-102 official cmt. 1 (1990).
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